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Abstract: Is nonverbal communication capable of affecting economic outcomes? We study 
the effect of anticipated approval and disapproval, expressed through emoticons, on 
generosity and show that it discourages selfish behavior. In our experiment subjects play a 
one-shot dictator game at the end of which the recipient can respond to the allocation by 
drawing an emoticon and sending it back to the dictator. While the observed effect of 
nonverbal communication is somewhat weaker than the anticipation of a verbal response, our 
results provide evidence that people are willing to trade-off pecuniary gains to avoid 
disapproval or seek approval of their peers and that the sheer anticipation of receiving a 
response, even nonverbal, is sufficient to change their behavior. 
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Introduction 
Is nonverbal communication capable of affecting economic outcomes? Anecdotal evidence 
suggests it might be, as power companies in the US have incorporated nonverbal feedback 
into approaches to reduce household power consumption and conserve energy.
1
 In the UK, 
regional councils implemented speed signs displaying a smiling face when people are driving 
at or below the speed limit and a frowning face if they are speeding. The signs were able to 
decrease the number of drivers exceeding the speed limit by 53% (Sadler, 2009). Yet little is 
known about the mechanisms through which nonverbal communication influences decisions 
as in everyday life it is often combined with verbal expressions of, say, encouragement or 
expectations. In this paper we focus on one such mechanism and ask whether nonverbal cues 
are sufficient means of expressing approval and disapproval and whether this effect is 
anticipatory and deters selfish behavior.  
The use of wordless signals and cues such as facial expression, body posture, or eye contact 
play a prominent role in communication. Burgoon et al. (1996) estimate that almost two-
thirds of the meaning of a social encounter is derived from nonverbal cues. The introduction 
of internet and mobile devices has resulted in new ways of how individuals and businesses 
communicate, with the face-to-face communication or phone calls being replaced by emails, 
texts, and messages via social networks. An important factor lacking from messages 
transcribed into text and transferred online is the non-verbal component; without being able 
to see the facial expression it can often be hard to convey the meaning and the tone. As a 
result the recipient of such messages might perceive them in ways the sender did not intend. 
This deficiency led to an introduction of emoticons (or emoji), which are pictorial 
representations of human emotions, in online communication.
2
 Their use is common in social 
network sites, such as Facebook, where people often post information in expectation of 
obtaining an approval (‘like’) from their peers. It is ‘smiley’ and ‘frowning’ face emoticons 
that US power companies use to nudge people to conserve energy and UK regional councils 
to slow down speeding drivers, through creating anticipatory approval and disapproval 
effects. 
                                                          
1
 Opower produces energy consumption reports that are sent out to each household. The report contains 
feedback on the general energy consumption and includes a section where the consumption is rated using 
emoticons. This scheme has been successful in increasing energy efficiency as households reduce their energy 
consumption in anticipation of the nonverbal feedback on their energy reports (Stern, 2013). 
2
 Their increased use culminated in 2014 when the word of the year, for the first time, was not actually a word 
but an emoticon; specifically the red love heart emoji featured in the Apple keyboard (The Washington Post, 
2014). 
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To the best of our knowledge, there are no economic studies exploring the impact of 
nonverbal cues, despite their prominence in communication. The vast majority of existing 
studies on the effects of communication on economic decisions deal with either free-form or 
stylized messages (see Crawford, 1998 for a survey). This research shows that messages are, 
for example, capable of increasing cooperation (e.g. Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006), 
coordination (e.g. Cooper et al., 1992; Blume and Ortmann, 2007), enforcing social norms 
and preventing opportunistic behavior through informal non-monetary sanctions (e.g., 
Masclet et al., 2003; Rege and Telle, 2004).  
Ellingsen and Johanesson (2008) and Xiao and Houser (2009) show that anticipated verbal 
messages expressing emotions and approval/disapproval promote fair behavior even in one-
shot dictator game settings. Both experiments identify the crucial roles of approval seeking 
and disapproval avoidance in norm enforcement, which have been confounded with reactions 
to informal sanctions in repeated game experiments. However, the effect of nonverbal 
communication cannot be inferred from the effect of messages in either of these two 
experiments. While messages certainly add some element of emotional expression, the 
emotion conveyed by the nonverbal component of communication is lacking. Xiao and 
Houser interpret the increase in observed generosity of dictators as an avoidance of the 
‘sharp-tongue’, yet this could have been an avoidance of disapproval in general. If this is the 
case, then the anticipation of a disapproving nonverbal cue may be enough to deter people 
from acting in a selfish manner. The one-shot dictator game design thus provides a natural 
setting for studying the effects of nonverbal communication on deterring selfish behavior and 
for the relative comparison with the impact of verbal communication. 
 
Experimental design and procedures 
The experimental design consists of three conditions implemented in an across-subject 
design. The Baseline condition is a standard dictator game in which the randomly assigned 
dictator, (player A in the instructions) is endowed with $10 and the recipient (player B) with 
$0. The dictator can send any whole dollar amount between $1 and $10 to the randomly 
paired recipient or do nothing and keep both endowments unchanged. The recipient has no 
decision to make, thus the final allocation is entirely decided by the dictator.  
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The Emoticon condition is the same as Baseline except for an added stage at the end of the 
dictator game, where the recipient is given the opportunity to respond to the dictator’s 
decision. After the decision is revealed to the recipient, the recipient can draw an emoticon 
and send it to the dictator. All stages are announced before the game begins, thus the dictator 
knows that the recipient can respond to her decision prior to deciding on an amount to be sent 
to the recipient. The recipient is free to draw any emoticon, however the subjects are warned 
in the instructions that foul and/or threatening emoticons are prohibited. The emoticon 
drawing form for this stage includes an empty circle into which the recipient can draw an 
emoticon. 
The Message condition is the same as Baseline except for an added stage at the end of the 
dictator game, where the recipient is given the opportunity to respond to the dictator’s 
decision using a freeform written message. This is a replication of Ellingsen and Johanesson 
(2008) and Xiao and Houser (2009) that allows us to compare the effects of nonverbal 
communication with verbal. Just as in the Emoticon condition, all stages are announced 
before the game begins. The message form includes a blank sheet of paper with lines into 
which the recipient can write a message.
3
  
Our experimental design yields the following three testable hypotheses regarding the amount 
sent by dictators to their paired recipient: 
Hypothesis 1: Emoticon > Baseline 
Hypothesis 2: Message > Baseline 
Hypothesis 3: Emoticon = Message 
The experiment was conducted in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory at 
the University of Canterbury, with 188 undergraduate students serving as subjects. The 
participants were selected randomly from the database using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). An 
experimental session lasted 25 minutes on average, including the initial instruction period and 
the private payment of subjects. The subjects earned an average of 10 New Zealand Dollars 
                                                          
3
 The goal of the current experiment is not to identify the incremental effect of nonverbal communication in a 
situation where a person can use both messages and nonverbal cues. Design exploring such question would 
include both a message form and an emoticon form and explicitly mention this in the instructions. We are 
interested in comparing the effects of ‘pure’ verbal communication with nonverbal. This is not to say that no 
emoticons were drawn on message forms; in fact there were 12/32 recipients who used an emoticon, however, 
the instructions emphasized that the recipients would write messages, which is what arguably drove the 
anticipation of dictators. 
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(NZD) including a NZD 5 show up fee.
4
 All sessions were run under a single-blind protocol, 
in which there was full anonymity between subjects, however the experimenter could track 
subjects’ decisions and identities. 
 
Results 
Table 1 summarizes subject behavior and Figure 1 shows the distribution of amounts sent by 
dictators in our three conditions. The statistical tests are presented in Table 2. 
Table 1. Summary statistics  
Data Baseline (n = 30) Emoticon (n = 32) Message (n = 32) 
Average amount sent 2.67 3.44 4.09 
[2.15] [1.93] [2.37] 
Median amount sent 3 4 5 
Frequency of positive amount sent 70% 84.4% 84.4% 
{21} {27} {27} 
Average positive amount sent 3.81 4.07 4.85 
Frequency of emoticons sent - 96.9% - 
{31} 
Frequency of messages sent - - 100% 
{32} 
Standard deviations in brackets. Number of dictators in braces. 
 
Emoticons were drawn by all but one of the recipients in the Emoticon condition. These 
emoticons portrayed an array of different emotions, ranging from frowning and crying faces 
to smiling and winking faces (see the appendix). The amounts sent in Emoticon are weakly 
significantly higher than in Baseline (p=0.093), supporting Hypothesis 1 that anticipated non-
verbal communication is capable of deterring selfish behavior. However, we do not find any 
effect of non-verbal communication on the frequency of sending a positive amount (p=0.147) 
or the proportion of equal splits (p=0.379). The effect on the proportion of splits that give the 
recipient at least 40% of the pie is marginally statistically insignificant (p=0.104).
5
 
                                                          
4
 At the time of the experiment the minimum wage in New Zealand was $14.25/hour.  
5
 We categorized emoticons as positive, neutral, or negative expressions. The average amount sent by dictators 
who received a positive emoticon in return was $4.67, neutral $2.63, and negative $0.20. The differences 
between amounts given for each emotional category were all statistically significant: positive vs. negative 
p=0.0002, positive vs. neutral p=0.0004 and negative vs. neutral p=0.0122. 
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Figure 1. The distribution of amount sent by dictators 
 
We find the effect of anticipated verbal communication on preventing selfish behavior to be 
stronger than the effect of non-verbal communication. We replicate the main results by 
Ellingsen and Johanesson (2008) and Xiao and Houser (2009) and find the amounts sent in 
Message to be significantly higher than in Baseline (p=0.006), supporting Hypothesis 2 that 
ex post messages result in a ‘sharp tongue’ avoidance effect. This is also true conditional on 
sending a positive amount (p=0.010) as well as for the equal splits (0.011) and splits that give 
the recipient at least 40% of the pie. We do not find any effect on the frequency of sending a 
positive amount (p=0.147). 
While verbal communication increases the average amounts sent by more than non-verbal 
communication, this difference is marginally statistically insignificant for all data (p=0.109), 
providing some support for Hypothesis 3 that the anticipatory effects of verbal and non-
verbal communication do not differ. There is no difference in the frequency of sending a 
positive amount (p=1.000) or splits that give the recipient at least 40% of the pie (p=0.793). 
However, we observe weakly significantly more equal splits in Message than in Emoticon 
(0.077) and also a statistically significant difference in amounts sent conditional on the 
amount being positive (p=0.031). 
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Table 2. Tests for anticipated disapproval effects 
Data Mann-Whitney Test Fisher’s Exact Test of Proportions 
All data Positive amount 
sent 
Frequency of 
positive amount 
sent 
Frequency of ‘fair 
splits’ 
≥ 5:5 ≥ 6:4 
Emoticon vs. Baseline -1.32 -0.48 (0.147)
a (0.379)a (0.104)a 
(0.093)a (0.316)a    
Message vs. Baseline -2.54 -2.37 (0.147)
a (0.011)a (0.039)a 
(0.006)a (0.010)a    
Emoticon vs. Message 1.60 2.16 (1.000) (0.077) (0.793) 
(0.109) (0.031)    
p-values in parentheses. 
a
 One-sided test. 
 
Discussion 
Nonverbal cues are powerful tools in communication. Facial expression, body language, and 
gestures help convey the meaning of verbal messages and underline their tone. As such, they 
can have a nontrivial impact on economic decisions of agents and outcomes of interactions; 
however the channels through which they operate are not fully understood. In the current 
paper we isolate the anticipatory effect of emotion expression through the use of emoticons 
and show that even on its own it is capable of discouraging selfish behavior. While the 
observed effect is somewhat weaker than the anticipation of a verbal response, our 
experiment provides evidence that people are willing to trade-off pecuniary gains to avoid 
disapproval or gain approval of their peers and that the sheer anticipation of receiving a 
response, even nonverbal, is sufficient to change their behavior. 
While our results shed light on the design on mechanisms that curb opportunistic behavior, 
our experiment focuses only on a particular type of nonverbal communication and one 
channel through which it operates. Moreover, as a first step, we study the impact of nonverbal 
communication in isolation. To better understand its potential, the follow up research needs 
to explore other types of nonverbal cues and their interaction with verbal messages. 
 
Acknowledgements: Financial support was provided by the New Zealand Experimental Economics 
Laboratory at the University of Canterbury. 
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Appendix 1. Baseline Instructions 
Instructions 
Thank you for coming. Each of you will receive a $5 show-up fee, to be paid in cash at the end of the session. 
You will now have a chance to earn additional money. Earnings are confidential: only you and the experimenter 
will know the amount of money you make.  
The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation. From now until the 
end of the session, unauthorized communication of any nature with other participants is prohibited. If you 
violate this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.  
Roles and Pairing:  
Every participant has been assigned randomly to a role; the role you have been assigned is written in the top- 
right corner of this sheet. You have been randomly and anonymously paired with someone in this room. You 
will not know your partner's identity, nor will he/she know yours. Furthermore, these identities will not be 
revealed after the session is completed.  
The Decision:  
The decision concerns two people, Person A and Person B. Person A’s task is to divide $10 between themselves 
and their matched Person B. Total earnings for each person at the end of the experiment depends on the decision 
made by Person A. This decision is made only once.  
The Experiment: 
Stage 1: Person A chooses the division 
Person A will be given a Decision Form; he/she will indicate the dividing option he/she wishes to choose by 
circling it on the decision form. After this choice is made the experimenter will collect all of the Decision 
Forms.  
Stage 2: Person B receives Person A’s decision 
Person A’s decision will be revealed to his/her randomly matched Person B. Person B’s will then go one at a 
time to the payment desk where he/she will privately be paid a $5 show-up fee plus his/her earnings from the 
decision.  
Stage 3: Person A’s are paid 
Person A’s will then go one at a time to the payment desk where he/she will privately be paid a $5 show-up fee 
plus his/her earnings from the decision.  
Once you have been paid you are free to leave, we ask that you do not wait around outside the lab. Thank you 
for participating. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you to 
answer your question privately.  
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Appendix 2. Emoticon Instructions 
Instructions 
Thank you for coming. Each of you will receive a $5 show-up fee, to be paid in cash at the end of the session. 
You will now have a chance to earn additional money. Earnings are confidential: only you and the experimenter 
will know the amount of money you make.  
The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation. From now until the 
end of the session, unauthorized communication of any nature with other participants is prohibited. If you 
violate this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.  
Roles and Pairing:  
Every participant has been assigned randomly to a role; the role you have been assigned is written in the top- 
right corner of this sheet. You have been randomly and anonymously paired with someone in this room. You 
will not know your partner's identity, nor will he/she know yours. Furthermore, these identities will not be 
revealed after the session is completed.  
The Decision:  
The decision concerns two people, Person A and Person B. Person A’s task is to divide $10 between themselves 
and their matched Person B. Once the decision is made by Person A their randomly matched Person B will then 
have the opportunity to respond to this decision by drawing an emoticon (emotional-icon) to send back to 
Person A. Please note: written messages and foul and/or threatening emoticons are not allowed. Total earnings 
for each person at the end of the experiment depends on the decision made by Person A. This decision is made 
only once.  
The Experiment: 
Stage 1: Person A chooses the division 
Person A will be given a Decision Form; he/she will indicate the dividing option he/she wishes to choose by 
circling it on the decision form. After this choice is made the experimenter will collect all of the Decision 
Forms.  
Stage 2: Person B receives Person A’s decision 
Person A’s decision will be revealed to his/her randomly matched Person B, he/she will then have the 
opportunity to respond by drawing and sending an emoticon (emotional-icon) to his/her randomly matched 
Person A. After all Person B’s have finished, the experimenter will collect the Emoticon Drawing Forms.  
Stage 3: Person A receives Person B’s drawing, Person B’s are paid 
Person A will be given the Emoticon Drawing Form from their randomly matched Person B. Person B’s will 
then go one at a time to the payment desk where he/she will privately be paid a $5 show-up fee plus his/her 
earnings from the decision.  
Stage 4: Person A’s are paid 
Person A’s will then go one at a time to the payment desk where he/she will privately be paid a $5 show-up fee 
plus his/her earnings from the decision.  
Once you have been paid you are free to leave, we ask that you do not wait around outside the lab. Thank you 
for participating. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you to 
answer your question privately.  
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Appendix 3. Message Instructions 
Instructions 
Thank you for coming. Each of you will receive a $5 show-up fee, to be paid in cash at the end of the session. 
You will now have a chance to earn additional money. Earnings are confidential: only you and the experimenter 
will know the amount of money you make.  
The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in a particular situation. From now until the 
end of the session, unauthorized communication of any nature with other participants is prohibited. If you 
violate this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and from all payments.  
Roles and Pairing:  
Every participant has been assigned randomly to a role; the role you have been assigned is written in the top- 
right corner of this sheet. You have been randomly and anonymously paired with someone in this room. You 
will not know your partner's identity, nor will he/she know yours. Furthermore, these identities will not be 
revealed after the session is completed.  
The Decision:  
The decision concerns two people, Person A and Person B. Person A’s task is to divide $10 between themselves 
and their matched Person B. Once the decision is made by Person A their randomly matched Person B will then 
have the opportunity to respond to this decision by writing a message to send back to Person A. Please note: 
foul and/or threatening messages are not allowed. Total earnings for each person at the end of the experiment 
depends on the decision made by Person A. This decision is made only once.  
The Experiment: 
Stage 1: Person A chooses the division 
Person A will be given a Decision Form; he/she will indicate the dividing option he/she wishes to choose by 
circling it on the decision form. After this choice is made the experimenter will collect all of the Decision 
Forms. 
 Stage 2: Person B receives Person A’s decision 
Person A’s decision will be revealed to his/her randomly matched Person B, he/she will then have the 
opportunity to respond by writing and sending a message to his/her randomly matched Person A. After all 
Person B’s have finished, the experimenter will collect the Message Forms.  
Stage 3: Person A receives Person B’s message, Person B’s are paid 
Person A will be given the Message Form from their randomly matched Person B. Person B’s will then go one 
at a time to the payment desk where he/she will privately be paid a $5 show-up fee plus his/her earnings from 
the decision.  
Stage 4: Person A’s are paid 
Person A’s will then go one at a time to the payment desk where he/she will privately be paid a $5 show-up fee 
plus his/her earnings from the decision.  
Once you have been paid you are free to leave, we ask that you do not wait around outside the lab. Thank you 
for participating. If you have any questions, please raise your hand and the experimenter will come to you to 
answer your question privately.   
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Appendix 4. Decision Form 
 
 
 
Decision Form 
 
 
As a Person A, I choose to give to Person B (Please circle only one option): 
$0  $1  $2  $3  $4  $5  $6  $7  $8  $9  $10 
That is, 
Person A gets $____  , Person B gets $____ 
*If you circle more than one option or if you do not circle any option, you will be paid only the $5 show up fee. 
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Appendix 5. Emoticon Drawing Form 
 
 
 
Emoticon Drawing Form 
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Appendix 6. Message Form 
Message Form 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
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Appendix 7. Emoticon Drawings 
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Appendix 8. Freeform Messages 
 
I was worried for a second because I can't control anything. I'm kinda a control freak 
sometimes… Then, I decided to just relax because I might meet someone nice, like 
you! Thank you very much! =) 
Cheers bro!!  
More than nothing :)  
That makes me feel bad :( Thanks for being awesome though!!!  
I hope you have good use for this money  It's tough being a uni student I know! Us 
experimenting haha it's a hard life. Have a good day  
I guess you need the money? I totally understand though 70/30 is fair enough  
atleast you didn't leave me with $0 Thanks and have a nice day!  
Deal!!! 
This is a fair decision as we both end up with the same amount. It makes sense to 
choose the middle number. However if a higher payment was chosen would it benefit 
both of us or just one same goes for a lower payment.  
Thank you for being so kind… my faith in humanity has been restored. P.s spend it on 
something good atleast. From poor student.  
Hey, thanks for splitting the money! Have a good day   
Very much appreciated, you are clearly a kind and honest person and I wish you 
many years of good health for you and your family   
An explanation as to why you decided to give no amount is all I seek. I am sure I will 
understand if the motive is constructive.  
Thank you for your kind generosity to evenly share the money between partners. I 
appreciate your decision to share.   
I guess this was an experiment to see how much you would take when you don't know 
who you were taking from. So thanks for not being entirely selfish but I suppose you 
did get the advantage picking Person A. I think I will spend my winnings on a hot 
chocolate. Enjoy your day and congratulations on making $4 extra dollars than me. 
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Thank you kind stranger! Nice to know that there are still good people like yourself in 
this world. Have a wonderful day and know you have surprised me and restored my 
faith in humanity. I will leave smiling and hope you do too! All the best =) All you 
need is love...  
Thanks, friend   
I'm a poor student, I hope you feel bad 
Dear, Thank you and have a nice afternoon  
Thanks yo. Would have done the same. Haha  
Prefer A $0 B $10 but OK  
Hello, Thanks! Very kind of you to share  Have a good day. B  
Thank you, I would have been happy with a 50/50 split though 
You get $5, I get $5  
Hi person A I'll accept the $5. I would love to have $10. But oh well 
How desperate are you for money at the moment mate? 
You are a fair and just person. Thanks for making this decision. Cheers mate!!! 
Probably would've done the same if I was Person A but would've liked a 50/50 split, 
but yeah fair enough 
Thanks for equally sharing the amount. I hope you have a nice day! 
It's okay. I still love you.  
Thank you very much  
Fair - Done deal  
Good choice!! I wish you a very good day!!!  
 
 
 
 
 
